Europe can not be party to wars due to absence of allegiance to the living messiah
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Dr Muhammad Mukhtar Alam, Cognitive Clinical Psychologist, and Development Professional | Advocating for the Unity of 7.97 billion souls in allegiance to 49th Imam and Fatemi Khalifatullah Mowlana Kareem Shah Al Hussaini post debates on the academic conclusions on the sole thesis on the reference to Lord Ramachandra's vasudhaiv kutumbkum declaration referred in the Congress Manifesto of 1989.|Papers and Presentations at http://slideshare.net/mukhtaralam
On this edition of Parallax Views, Israel continues bombing Gaza, Houthis launch a drone strike on the Israeli city of Eilat, Israel conducts airstrikes in Doha, Qatar, the Gaza aid flotilla is being swarmed by Israel according to crew, and European states are recognizing Palestinian statehood. A lot is going on in terms of the Middle East and especially Israel Palestine. James M. Dorsey of the Turbulent World blog/Substack, a longtime scholarly commenter on the Middle East, returns to break it all down and discuss a number of topics including the two-state solution vs. the one-state solution vs. the one-state reality, Gulf and Arab states now seeing Israel as a bigger security threat than Israel, Israel’s attack on a compound in Gaza that killed members of the Doghmush clan and its implications, Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard’s Knesset run, problems with the Palestine Authority, Israel’s West Bank annexation plans, and much, much more. Transcript [James M. Dorsey] JG, thank you very much for that very kind introduction. It’s always a pleasure to be with you. [J. G. Michael] Real quick. So how is the sub stack going and how can my listeners subscribe to it? I want to promote it since I know you have a lot of paid posts and it really is a useful resource. [James M. Dorsey] Thank you. It’s going well. The sub stack has 26,000 readers. The column itself across several platforms has about 50,000 readers. I look for paid subscribers simply because I need to cover costs and that’s a way of ensuring that I can continue to do this. This is a good time to subscribe because at the moment there’s a 20 percent discount on an annual subscription. People who are interested can go to and choose one of the options. [J. G. Michael] So, there’s a lot to discuss right now. I’m seeing reports that Israel has killed 84 Palestinians in war-devastated Gaza strikes. That’s from Al Jazeera today, September 24th. I guess there was a Yemen drone attack on Israel and there’s been 20 injured. That also happened today. There is a lot going on. Oh, and I should have mentioned the Gazan aid flotilla has been swarmed by Israeli drones, crew members say. That was just reported by Politico. Then on top of all of that, we have the issues with elements of Europe wanting to recognise a Palestinian state and the pushback against that. There is a lot happening right now and I really don’t know where to begin. Also, I should mention I believe Trump has been trying to reassure his friends in the Arab world that he won’t allow an annexation of the West Bank. I’m also seeing that in the news now. So there’s all of these stories breaking now or in the past few days. I don’t know where to start. Where do you think the most important place to look at is right now? Where should our eyes and ears be? [James M. Dorsey] Look, let’s try and bring a little bit of logic or system into the madness, the confusion. I think you need to separate, if you wish, different kinds of conflicts. So with regard to Israel-Palestine and particularly Gaza, I think it’s very clear that Trump wants the hostages released and he wants them released now. He also puts the blame, whether accurate or not, on the fact that he hasn’t been able to secure a ceasefire on Hamas rather than Israel. I think Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is realising that the window of opportunity is closing and a crucial moment in that will be when Netanyahu meets Trump, if I’m not incorrect, on Monday in the White House, the only leader to have visited the White House four times since Trump started his second term in office. That meeting is going to be crucial because that’s going to be where Trump lays down the parameters of a response to the recognition of Palestine as a state by a whole slew of U.S. allies, particularly Britain and France. Netanyahu has several options. One option is that he responds bilaterally, for example, by reducing the level of diplomatic representation in Israel, closing consulates in Jerusalem, possibly removing certain diplomatic privileges. The other option he has, which has been touted by Israeli officials, is an option that my guess Trump will not want, which is a partial annexation of the West Bank in response to the recognition of the state of Palestine. I have no doubt that the Arab and Muslim leaders who met with Trump in New York yesterday will have made very clear that that’s a red line, even though anonymous Emirati officials have said that annexation would not lead to a rupture in diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel. So that’s one set of issues. I think when it comes to the Houthis and Hezbollah, I think we’ve got to be very clear. These were tit-for-tats wars that were started by the Houthis and by Hezbollah. They were not started by Israel. Now Israel has been far more proactive in violation of the ceasefire with Hezbollah since the ceasefire was concluded last November with repeated attacks inside Lebanon and a continued military presence in southern Lebanon. The Houthis, the Israelis are reactive. Every time they attack the Houthis, they’re responding to an Houthi attack on Israel. The other element in that is that if there were a ceasefire in the near future, then the Houthis by their own statements will stop the attacks on Israel. And in fact, if you go back to the ceasefire earlier this year, the Houthis did stick to their promise not to attack shipping and Israel during the period of the ceasefire. [J. G. Michael] If you could, can you explain the situation with the Houthis? Because I know there was that incident, I think a few weeks ago, where there were some bureaucrats that got taken out by Israel in Yemen. And I knew people that were saying, well, this is the end of the Houthis. And I said, I don’t really think so, because they haven’t taken out the sort of religious movement it’s associated with. Am I on base or off base about that? [James M. Dorsey] No. Look, first of all, they haven’t taken out Hamas. They’ve seriously weakened Hamas, but they haven’t taken it out. They haven’t taken out Hezbollah. They’ve seriously weakened Hezbollah, but not to the degree where Hezbollah basically is willing to concede. And I think the same is true for the Houthis. Now, keep in mind that, you know, what I said before, Israeli responses, they may be sledgehammer responses, but nonetheless, Israeli responds to Houthi attacks. It hasn’t tried to take the Houthis out. And that would probably be a bridge too far, because that would really take presumably carpet bombing. And Yemen is a long way from Israel, if not ground troops. And Israel at this point can’t afford a war like that, nor would the Gulf want to see that, even if they are not necessarily sympathetic to the Houthis as such. [J. G. Michael] I also, I should have mentioned this earlier. So I’m looking at the article right now from Politico. I don’t think we can really talk about it, because it’s really breaking it. I mean, the article was released at 12.31 p.m. my time. So just an hour ago, it was released. Trump promises Arab Muslim leaders he won’t let Israel annex the West Bank. That’s Politico. That’s an exclusive to Politico that just came out an hour ago as of this recording. You mentioned earlier reports that the UAE won’t cut ties with Israel if the West Bank is annexed. I’ve also heard, though, that they could downgrade diplomatic ties. Reuters was reporting that around the same time, that they could downgrade diplomatic ties if there’s an annexation of the West Bank. What do you think is going on with all of that? Do you think Arab countries are beginning to get worried about Israel’s actions and how this could affect them long term? [James M. Dorsey] Well, I think that first of all, Arab countries, particularly the Gulf, but not only the Gulf, see Israel today as a greater threat than Iran. And I think that you’ve got to keep in mind that the Gulf was always less concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme and far more concerned about the axis of resistance, with other words, that alliance of state and non-state actors. So Hezbollah, Hafez al-Assad when he was, sorry, Bashar al-Assad when he was still in power in Syria, the Iraqi Shiite militias, and the Houthis, and Hamas, of course. And they were far more concerned about Iran’s ballistic missile programme. So I think today what you’re seeing is two things. One is perceptions of Israel having significantly changed, in part because of the way Israel has conducted the Gaza war, but also because of the Israeli attack on the Hamas leadership in Qatar. And so what that has done is, one, it’s rejiggered perceived threats in the Middle East. It’s forced the Gulf states, certainly, to a certain degree, to rethink their defence strategy and their reliance on the United States. Now, what I mean with rethink is at the end of the day, the Gulf states have no other address but Washington to go to. And I think you’ve seen that very clearly, for example, in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli attack on Qatar, when Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Doha, a significant topic on the agenda was closer U.S.-Qatari defence ties. Now, at the same time, the United States is perceived as or Gulf states question the reliability of the United States as their security provider, even if they don’t have any options. And that goes back to the 2019 attacks claimed by the Houthis on Saudi oil facilities. It goes back to, in 2020, Houthi attacks on critical infrastructure in the UAE. It goes back to the U.S.’s failure to pressure Israel on the Gaza issue. And, of course, the fact that despite having the largest air force base in the region in Doha, U.S. forces were not able to, in a timely fashion, warn that these missiles were incoming, if not intercept them. And so what you’re seeing is Gulf states not moving away from the U.S., but diversifying, broadening their defence relationships, the Saudi-Pakistani defence agreement, for example. And I think you probably will also see some diversification in weapons acquisitions. [J. G. Michael] And we should mention, so Israel launched an airstrike in Doha, Qatar, on September 9, 2025. So that’s what we’re referring to, the fallout from that. I have an article pulled up from Times of Israel. Qatar and Jordan denounce Netanyahu as a warmonger, a regional threat. They visit our country and plot to attack at wills of the mayor, as Abdullah warns greater Israel would involve blatant violation of the sovereignty of Israel’s neighbours. Yeah, it seems like things are very tense. What do you think the next moves are for both Israel and its neighbouring countries? [James M. Dorsey] Well, first of all, I think, let’s be clear. There are parties in government that believe in greater Israel or have greater Israel as their policy, and to a degree that includes Likud. [J. G. Michael] Can you explain what greater Israel means in this context, if I have listeners? [James M. Dorsey] It means that essentially Jordan is Palestine, Israeli control of southern Syria, control of southern Lebanon, and obviously the occupied territories, occupied Palestinian territories, but that is not official government policy. What I think, and we’ve discussed this before, that there is, on the other hand, a change in Israeli defence doctrine. So, in the past, the Israeli defence doctrine was deterrence, in part to collective punishment and through sledgehammer responses to threats and attacks on Israel. What we’ve seen in the last two years is that Israel wants to militarily emasculate its foes or those it perceives as threats. So, the claim that they’re going to totally destroy Hamas, the demands for full disarmament of Hezbollah, the substantial sustained attacks on the Syrian military to deprive it of its military capabilities and infrastructure, as well as support for Syrian minorities, some of which may have secessionist ambitions. And so, you know, that’s what I think, those are the two things that what you were just reading aloud refer to. [J. G. Michael] In another recent interview, not with my show, but with another show, you stated that, I’m just going to quote you here, I think we’re at a crucial cross point. Contrary to much of common wisdom that it was already too late for a two-state solution, I think that option was still possible until now. If you could, can you elaborate on what you meant by that? Why do you think the two-state is now becoming increasingly difficult as a solution for this conflict? [James M. Dorsey] So, the argument that the two-state solution is history is basically based on looking at a map and seeing the dots across the West Bank of Israeli settlements. And if you indeed look at that, unless you’re going to move 750,000 settlers out of the West Bank, or allow the settlers to be under Palestinian jurisdiction, you can’t build a Palestinian state there. The problem is, it’s not about the number of settlements. What it’s about is population concentrations. And the bulk of the settlers are in settlements close to what is called the Green Line, which is the pre-1967 war borders between the West Bank and Israel. And so, if 80% are concentrated close to that border, you can bring the bulk of Israeli settlers under Israeli jurisdiction, in case of this creation of a Palestinian state, through land swaps. What we’ve seen more recently in recent weeks is the Israeli government having adopted a settlement programme for what is called E1. And E1 is an area that stretches out of Jerusalem into the West Bank and, for all practical purposes, divides the northern part of the West Bank from the southern part of the West Bank. And so, if that were to become reality, then the notion of a contiguous Palestinian state, contiguous at least in terms of the West Bank, becomes history. [J. G. Michael] Yeah, I was thinking, as you were speaking about that, about Dr. Shah El-Eryali, who I believe was in the IDF and has been a big proponent of the two-state. He wrote a very interesting piece called, I think it was a whole book called Deceptive Appearances, Do the Jewish Settlements in the West Bank Negate the Feasibility of the Two-State Solution? He argues that it doesn’t, and there is a way around this. You’re saying, though, that recent events are actually foreclosing what Eryali and others are saying used to be possible. [James M. Dorsey] Yeah. I mean, Shaul is a reserve colonel. I think he’s a colonel, but he’s a reserve officer in the Israeli Defence Forces. And he actually was called up in the last two years during the Gaza War. I’m not quite sure where he served, whether he served in Gaza or elsewhere. But he’s written a book, and he’s also done a number of studies, which basically argued what I was just arguing. And if you go back to the negotiations that took place between the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, post-Oslo, and Israel, there were land swaps built into those discussions. So it’s not just Shaul or other academics or analysts claiming this. It actually was part of the negotiation. [J. G. Michael] I’m curious. I wanted to bring this to your attention. We may have talked about it before. We may have not talked about it. But one thing I see people get confused about when talking about the two-state versus one-state solution is the one-state reality hypothesis that people like Nathan Brown, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and also most famously Ian Lustick have talked about. I don’t think what they’re talking about is the same though as the one-state solution. What do you make of the one-state reality hypothesis? Are you familiar with it? [James M. Dorsey] Yes, no, I am familiar with it. Look, de facto it’s correct. Israel controls the West Bank. And you saw, I think it was today, maybe yesterday, the closure of only one bridge that Palestinians can use to exit the West Bank. So Israel has control. And in that sense, it’s a de facto one-state. The problem with it is, of course, that Palestinians in Gaza obviously live under Israeli bombardment. Palestinians in the West Bank live under Israeli occupation and continued aggression. So that’s not really a sustainable basis for a one-state. The issue here is that if you were to do it, first of all, you can ask yourself whether a one-state is realistic after what has happened in Gaza. I mean, that has set things back in terms of trauma on both sides of the divide enormously, the psychological impact of this on both sides. But even leaving that aside, the Israel in recent years has essentially fortified, if you wish, laws that would prevent a one-state in which all its citizens have equal rights. And on top of that, for an Israel that wants to preserve itself as a Jewish state, the demographics don’t work in a one-state. There are 7 million Israelis. Now, of those 7 million, roughly 20% are Palestinians with Israeli nationality. There are 7 million Palestinians. You know, so it’s not like the two-state solution is a panacea. I think even before Gaza, but certainly after Gaza, if you have a relationship similar to the Indian-Pakistani relationship, you’ve got a good relationship. This is not going to be lovey-dovey, let’s forget the past. But it’s sort of the same thing that Churchill said about democracy. It’s the best of bad options. [J. G. Michael] Well, it also back goes back to what you’ve said before about you know the Palestinians can have their narrative and the Israelis can have their iswhat matters is are they able to exist alongside each other even if they have those competing narratives? [James M. Dorsey] Well, it’s, it’s, you know, basically and the far right in Israel was much more honest on these things than much of the Zionist movement, which is that, you know, both. There are legitimate claims on both sides and, you know, and both sides are entitled to their narrative, don’t necessarily need to see that narrative as a threat, but need to understand that both sides need to make compromises to get out of what is a death spiral. [J. G. Michael] I want to delve into what you make of Europe’s reactions to what has been happening, especially lately. I think there’s, you know, a rift happening between certain European countries and Israel over the idea of Palestinian statehood. How significant is that? [James M. Dorsey] I think it’s significant. First of all, I think you need to, when you make a judgment on what’s the value of recognition of Palestine, you need to segment your analysis. So if you’re looking at does this end the Gaza war? No, it doesn’t. It’s a symbolic move. It gives Palestinians a brief moment of hope and good news, not more and not less. However, on a state level, this significantly boosts the status of Palestine and it facilitates all kinds of dealings that Europeans and others will have with, with Palestine as a state rather than as an entity. And ultimately, it’s going to put greater pressure on those European states that have recognized Palestine in terms of, as Israel proceeds, for example, if it does the next territory, to respond to that with measures that are more significant. Now, I think the other thing to take into consideration with this is, you know, the perception is that the Europeans don’t have clout, that they can’t get their act together, they’re divided and so on. I think you got to keep in mind that it’s not the United States, it’s Europe that is Israel’s largest and most important economic partner. A trade between Europe and Israel outstrips by significant amounts trade between the United States and Israel. Investment. Both European investment in Israel and Israeli investment in Europe significantly outstrips. Outstrips investment both ways between the United States and Israel. The other part of it is this is not to diminish the importance of the United States. The United States is important. There’s no question about, in terms of diplomatic coverage, in terms of financial support, and clearly in terms of armed supplies, but Roughly, Israel’sacquires 70% of weapons it buys from the United states. The other 30% come from Europe with Germany as Israel’s second largest arms supplier. So with other words, if 30% of your arms acquisitions come into play, that’s something Israel has to take seriously. [J. G. Michael] In terms of the reactions within Israel to European recognition of Palestinian statehood, what do you make of the reactions that have been coming out of Israel. And is Israel making a mistake for itself in the way it’s reacting? [James M. Dorsey] Look, is Hamas going to exploit the recognition and claim credit for it? Of course it will. But the argument that this is going to help this, this is going to delay negotiations, this, that and the other is an argument that Israel has put forward for years and it’s been fundamentally the same argument, even if the circumstance in which that was being discussed as different. So there’s no great validity to that argument. You could also argue the opposite, that if you don’t recognize Palestine, you’re validating Netanyahuus’s policies. So I don’t attribute a lot of importance to that argument. The fundamental problem is that Israel does not want to see a Palestinian state. It’s very clear about that. It’s very clear that its major war goal in Gaza is squashing Palestinian national aspirations. And so it is going to oppose, know virulently any move thatfurthers those aspirations. [J. G. Michael] I was going to ask, I hope this isn’t too weird how I’m framing this, but doesn’t that sort of, if Israel stated, we don’t want any Palestinian nationalism we want that squashed, doesn’t it get to a point where, especially with this one state reality, it becomes harder to justify everything based on the idea of Israel defending itself from external threats? Like if the borders vanish and you’re just saying, well, we have to squash Palestinian nationalism and essentially you have a one state reality, then aren’t the Palestinians just an internal security threat for Israel? And by that logic, why does the US have to support them? Could these eventually become issues for Israel as sort of what I’m getting at? Because I do see elements of both the left and the right in the US becoming more critical of Israel. And I think there’s this mentality that some have, especially on the conservative end here, that, well, that’s an Israeli problem, not ours. Do you think that could become a problem for Israel going forward? [James M. Dorsey] I think it already is a problem. But the problem with that is that there were segments of Israel, including segments of this government, who are proponents of ethnic cleansing. And ethnic cleansing, of course would solve the problem, they think. I mean, that’s a fallacy. There’s something that Israelis can learn from their own history, which is that Jews in their own perception were in exile for 2000 years, never lost their bond to the land and came back. Well, the Palestinian bond to that land is equally strong. So even if you remove depopulated Gaza and potentially The west bank, you don’t necessarily have squashed the aspirations. That’s one, two is. There’s no question that there are elements, significant elements within the Israeli government who are proponents of ethnic cleansing. But that never became official Israeli policy until Donald Trump opened the door to that in February of this year when he basically reduced Gaza to a luxury real estate development project. And to do that, Gazan Palestinians dep. Population needed to be resettled. And so suddenly Netanyahu, the Defense Minister, Israel Katz and others could declare this to be Israeli policy. So the Israelis are not just as a matter of principle, rejecting the notion of a two state solution, they’re undermining the notion of a one state solution. [J. G. Michael] I’m also curious, I don’t know if you consider this relevant at all, but I heard last, last month that the Israeli ex spy Jonathan Pollard is running for Knesset. And a lot of people said to me, oh well, Pollard’s sort of just this almost like weird celebrity figure in Israel that everyone talks about SOT sort of like almost like how Mordecai Vanunu is just this sort of a scene as like an eccentric character that had some significance in the past. But I do think it’s telling that someone like Pollard, who is really to the most extreme end of the right in Israel, I mean, he’s so extreme he just thinks that Israel should go out alone. We don’t need the U.S. we can just build the bombs on our own and do everything on our own and eliminate the enemy, as he says. Do you think him running for the Knesset is sort of significant in that it’s showing that there’s a lot more. I mean, the far right is really making its bid for power and it is in power at this point. Do you think things are deteriorating even more when it comes to the far right in Israel? [James M. Dorsey] Pollard always was on the far right of Israel. And he may believe that with the far right in power now, his chances of returning to public life, if you wish, by running for Parliament, are better than they’ve been in the past. Now the polls in terms of what how the far right would score in the next election don’t necessarily bear that out. But I think you also have to keep in mind the notion of independence from the United States or a, a less dependent relationship with the United States is a notion that’s widespread. One of the first things that Menachem Begin did when he was elected for the first time as became prime minister in 1977 was declare independence from the United States. You’ve had in the last week or two, Netanyahu talk about an autarkic Israeli economy and Israel being a super Sparta, which in a lot of ways was also a declaration of independence from the United States. And you have the Heritage foundation, which is, as far as I can see, part of Trump’s brain trust, basically coming out with a plan. Essentially you have the beginning of talks about a new memorandum of understanding between Israel and the United States. So under Obama, Israel and the United States signed a 10 year memorandum of understanding that guaranteed Israel $3.8 billion in military assistance annually. The Heritage foundation suggests that that structure should be changed, that over a period of 20 years, 22 years, whatever, Israel would receive $4 billion a year, but that amount would be reduced by $250 million every year, in addition to which Israel would be obliged to buy $250 million worth in military gear from the United States. And that at the end of this process, Israel would no longer be a aid recipient, but a full partner of the United States. So that thinking of anything running from declaring independence of the United States to a significantly altered relationship inwhich the balance of power changes, that’s, that’s quite widespread. [J. G. Michael] I guess what I want to, what I was trying to get at earlier in mentioning Pollard was what is the political situation in Israel in terms of resistance to Netanyahu? Because I think they’re still liberal Zionists, but it just seems like the far right is extremely empowered right now and I don’t know that there can be any resistance to it. [James M. Dorsey] Well, look, first of all, let’s make some things clear there is a majority of Israelis who want to see the back of Netanyahu. There probably is a majority of Israelis who want to see the back of people like national security minister Ben Gvir [J. G. Michael] What do you mean by that? The back of. [James M. Dorsey They want to see them out and they want to see them out today. Now they, that does not mean necessarily that there are on some issues at least major policy differences. So a majority of Israelis want to see the war end, not because what is being done to Palestinians in Gaza, not because what this is doing to Israel’s standing in the world, but because they want the hostages back. And increasingly, to be fair, many Israelis are asking themselves what’s the point of extending the war? And it’s the Netanyahus and the Ben Gvirs and the Smotriches, the finance minister, of this world, who want to continue that war. Don’t forget that. You know, I mentioned there’s trauma on both Sides of the fence. Israel’s used to wars that take days or weeks. This is the longest war Israel has fought and it’s disrupting families, it’s disrupting businesses. There’s enormous psychological trauma of soldiers coming back given what they, even if they haven’t participated in what people would consider war crimes, just having witnessed a lot of what has happened. But on the other hand, a large majority of Israelis is perfectly happy with ethnic cleansing. [J. G. Michael] That’s what I was going to say. It seems like there is, there’s points of disagreement between I guess what could be called the left and the right in Israel or the liberal end and the right wing end. But it seems like there’s also points of a non-disagreement or even agreement. [James M. Dorsey But also see, look everybody, Netanyahu is a problem. There’s no question about it. Netanyahu is not the problem. If you were to get a government put together, and at this point, you know, a next election would probably produce a government put together by the opposition, their fundamental policies aren’t going to be that different. It’s just that they’re going to be more polished and smarter about going about it. But you, the Benny gnzs of this world don’t wanta sovereign or not. The Naftali Bennets of this world don’t want to see an independent Palestinian state. Keep in mind that the settlements were initiated not by Likud, not by the Israeli right wing, they were initiated by Labor. Now to be fair, Israel’s immediate response to the conquests in the 1967 war. Leave Jerusalem out of this for a moment, basically was let’s sit down and know, let’s negotiate and we’re willing to withdraw. The Palestinians and the Arabs weren’t there yet. So you had the no, the three no’s, no negotiations, no recognition at the Arab summit in Khartoum in 67, but fact of the matter. And so as a result the settlements were initiated. The argument then being far more a security argument, which was questionable, but nonetheless and the religious justifications came later. So with other words, it’s not like the opposition is radically 100 degrees the opposite of what this government is. The opposition’s going to be a lot nicer guys to deal with in a sense, but not necessarily more flexible on very fundamental issues. [J. G. Michael] I guess. I know this is a hypothetical and if you can’t do it, then that’s fine. But hypothetically, how would it be? How would like a Naftali Bennett or you know, another government in Israel not, not led by Netanyahu? How would they hypothetically be more polished in their approach? [James M. Dorsey]: My guess is that they would be more sensitive to Israel standing in the world. I think they would. It’s been a maxim of Israeli policy, even despite what I said about Begin declaring independence from the United States. It’s been a maxim of Israeli policy never to get on the wrong side of the United States to make sure that you had US Backing. So you certainly with Trump, where you have a president who’s been more receptive to what the Israeli right and far right wants than any other US Leader, they’re going to be a more sensitive to what the United States thinks. And so you it’I think you’ll see tactical changes. You’ll see, you know, just a much more polished approach. [J. G. Michael] In terms of the Palestinians. I think there’s this foolhardy assumption by some people that I come across occasionally that will say, well, Hamas is the problem and we just need the Palestinian Authority, the Palestine Authority should just be in power and everything would be fixed. I mean, I’m probably over exaggerating how some people feel about that, but I’ve come across sentiments that are like that from people that I don’t think understand this sort of culture and politics in the Palestinian world. Because the fact of the matter is, far as I can tell is that there’s a lot of mistrust in the Palestinian world for the Palestinian Authority. Can you speak to that? [James M. Dorsey] Sure. I mean, look, but let me start it off this way. What the Palestinians really need to do is get their act together. And what that means is that on the one hand the Palestine Authority, which is the west bank based internationally recognized representation of the Palestinians, needs to reform. It’s perceived as incompetent, corrupt and fledgling. It needs to engage in serious reforms and it needs to do so not just to be a credible partner in whatever efforts may or may not take place in terms of post war Gaza as well as in terms of a resolution of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. But the other part of it is the Palestinians also need to get their act together in terms of some common basis for the Palestinian polity which is as divided between Fatah, which is the backbone of the Palestine Authority, and Hamas. [J. G. Michael] Well, that’s what I was going toa say. I think your criticism applies to both Hamas and the Palestine Authority. [James M. Dorsey] No, absolutely. Look, there’s you know, the perception Hamas are not nice guys by any stretch of the imagination and they committed a war crime on 7th October 2023. But fact of the matter is that their evolution to violence tells you a lot about the group and their political evolution. So they’ve always adhered to the armed struggle, but in their argument, the legitimacy of attacking Israeli civilians rather than only Israeli military targets was the attack on the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron in by Barch Goldstein and I forget in 1992 or 1994 in which 29 worshippers were killed. If you look closely at the attacks by Hamas prior to that incident and to the statements, the attacks were on Israeli soldiers, post-Baruch Goldstein, anybody in Israel was a legitimate target. So there is cause and effect here. The other part of the equation is that Hamas looks at the post Oslo 1993 accords process, which essentially was, you Palestinians need to leave your trump cards at the door. And when you’ve done that, we can talk. So that was Israel’s recognition of Israel and abolishing the armed struggle. And Hamas basically looks at that and says we’re now 32 years further and where are we? So their position is neither. Well, whatever arrangement with Israel in terms of the status of that relationship and the abandoning of the armed struggle can only come at the end of a -peace process, not at the beginning. And Hamas and its supporters basically argue that they’re willing to go for a long term hudna or ceasefire between Israel and Palestine. And that could be something that’s almost generational, 20, 30 years, but they won’t recognize Israel. You know, 20, 30 years, even five years is a long time. And you know,if you were to get the reality of a Palestinian state, even if it did not have full, particularly one that’s demilitarized, even if it does not fully recognize the state of Israel as such. This is not a, a static environment you know, they, they will realize that they don’t have a lot of choices. [J. G. Michael] What I, what I should have said earlier with regards to the Palestine Authority, you mentioned how it’s perceived as incompetent, as corrupt, as fledgling. I think some even view it as almost a collaborator. [James M. Dorsey] Absolutely. I mean, look, the Israelis have gone out of their way to undermine the credibility of the Palestine Authority and in a lot of ways have, and some of that was built into the Oslo Accords, have reduced it to a security arm that needs to help Israel secure, ensure its security. There’s no question about is. But that is the legally recognized entity that represents the Palestinians. It’s the entity the world wants to deal with. Even if, you know, many, including the Gulf states, say you’ve got to do some radical change. This cannot go on this way. But as a matter of principle, you know, that’s the vehicle. [J. G. Michael] I think earlier I I sort of cut you off and you were saying you were going to say the problem for Palestinians and I think what you were going toa say and you can correct me if I’m wrong on this, but I think your view is the problem is that the divisions politically within Palestinian society are part of what is weakening their negotiating position. [James M. Dorsey] Absolutely, Look, first of all, it’s a maxim of Israeli Palestinian history that hardliners on both sides of the divide reinforce each other. That’s one, two, the Israelis have not only sought to undermine the Palestine Authority, they have sought to keep the West Bank and Gaza separate from one each other and the hostility between Hamas and Fatah and the Authority alive. That’s one reason why the Netanyahu encouraged the gutariies to fund the Hamas government in Gaza. They didn’t want to see that government go. They wanted to see it as weak. They wanted to be able to control, but it served their purpose. [J. G. Michael] I also wanted to ask in regards to the militancy on both ends or the hardliners on both ends, I find sometimes that when I talk about the ideology or beliefs of militants, people assume that I’m trying to talk about it in moral terms when I’m not. And I think you have to understand hardliners, even if you disagree with them. But I find it very difficult because people immediately take up a moralizing language. U I don’t how important do you think it is that we understand the logic of the hardliners in this conflict whether we agree or disagree with them morally? [James M. Dorsey] Look, I think it’s. It’s a sine quan non. It’s absolutely necessary. This is a war in which both parties demonize one another. It gets very dangerous if you start believing your own your own dehumanizing and demonizing arguments rather than look at the reality of it. And I think that’s what we’re seeing, you know, so re you’re operating on perceptions rather than what may be factually correct. [J. G. Michael] Before closing out here, I think we do need to talk about your recent piece from the 23rd Israel cuts off its nose despite its face. And I feel like this has been theme that you’ve mentioned before that Israel has done this in the past. [James M. Dorsey] Not in those words, but yes. [J. G. Michael] And this article deals with, you know, Israel’s targeting of a compound which took out one of the very powerful clans in Gaza, killing 25 extended family members of this clan. Maybe you can talk about why this is significant in detail. [James M. Dorsey] Well, first of all, this is this was not the first attack on the Klan. There was an attack in November 23, 2023, in which 44 members of the extended family members were killed. And there have been as few incidents in between in which smaller numbers were killed. [J. G. Michael] What’s the name of the K clan? I think it’s the Doghmus. [James M. Dorsey] It’s called the Doghmus. And they are a very powerful gang. There are criminal elements there. Drug dealing, arm smuggling. There are members of the clan have been associated across the political spectrum, some with Israel, some with Hamas. At one point, they in 2005 established the army of Islam, which was involved in kidnappings, including the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit, which was. The Israeli soldier was kidnapped in 2006 and held until 2011 and ultimately exchanged for 1,027 prisoners held in Israeli prisons, including Yahya Sinwar, one of the Architects of the October 23, 2020 Sorry, October 7, 2023 attack, and a leader of Hamas who was killed in October of last year by the Israelis. Essentially, the significance of all of this is. And the Doghmus are not the only clan or extended family that has been attacked and has suffered significant losses. But the significance is that Israel, for obvious reasons, does not want Hamas to play any role in any future administration of Gaza. It also doesn’t want the Palestine Authority to play any role. And so Israel needs an alternative. And in Israeli minds, the alternatives were these clans who often had troubled relations. [J. G. Michael] With Hamas. [James M. Dorsey] But obviously killing 25 members of the family on Sunday in an attack on the compound isn’t a very endearing act. And so the likelihood that the clans would be willing, without some significant cover, to cooperate with Israel and be seen as collaborators with Israel, potentially even collaborators in ethnic cleansing. If that was an option before this attack, it certainly is not an option anymore. Now that can change if there is what I was describing ascover before. So it’s not impossible that the United Arab Emirates would potentially be willing to some degree associated with something like this. It’s very well possible that someone like Mohammed Dahlan, who’s a former Fatah security chief who was defeated by Hamas in 2007 and is a close associate of the Emirati president, that he could swing some. But for that, Israel would have to also make a number of concessions. And there’s no clarity that Israel would do that. [J. G. Michael] Why do you think that strategy of supporting clans like this was always doomed to fill from the outset? [James M. Dorsey] Well, essentially because it’s very hard for Palestinians to position themselves outside of what is the Palestine Authority, the recognized representative of the Palestinians, whether you like them or not. I mean, this would be an attempt to establish a third alternative, and I think many Palestinians would have problems with that. [J. G. Michael] I also wanted to ask you, you mentioned the sort of powerful information war that’s been going on and Israel sort of, I mean, essentially largely losing that. Do you think that’s really a matter of just the U I mean, there’s a definite power asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians U How much of that affects how we understand the conflict? [James M. Dorsey First of all, I think that Israel had a significant degree of empathy on October 7th and just as much as if Hamas had not been as brutal as it was in its attack on October 7th and if Hamas had concentrated on attacking military targets rather than killing 1,200 people, roughly the majority civilians, than Hamas may have had a little bit more empathy. By the same token, if Israel had been more methodical in its retaliation against Hamas, rather than killing enormous numbers of civilians and women and children and reducing, reducing the Strip to a pile of rubble le let alone the hair raising statements that are repeatedly made by Israeli leaders, it may have been able to maintain some of that empathy. But you know, you can say what you want. The images on televisions tell it all and it doesn’t matter what you say. If you see a starving child, an child without, without limbs, the absolute horror of people fleeing, being displaced, looking for food, those images, there’s no way you can compete. [J. G. Michael] In closing, I don’t like making predictions, but where do you think things are going to be going from here? I mean, taking into consideration Israel, its neighbours and the U.S. [James M. Dorsey] Look, I think that at the end of the day, we’re going to have to see an end to the Gaza war very soon. Don’t forget that, you know, Trump has interest in the Middle east and the United States has interest in the Middle east and he doesn’t want to endanger those. And so I think we’re going to see and fairly reasonably soon and end to the war. We’re not going to see a resolution of the conflict. But at this point, just ending the killing is, is crucial. [J. G. Michael] Well, James, I want to thank you again for coming on Parallax Views. iIf you could. Could you plug the Substack one more time? [James M. Dorsey] Sure. Well, first of all, thank you very much for having me. I enjoyed the conversation. I apologize. You may hear the rain coming down suddenly so I apologize for that, but I can’t control it. But I would welcome new readers and you can go to https://jamesmdorssey.substack.com and take advantage of the 20% discount on annual subscriptions. |
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